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Theoretical Implications of Comparative 
Survey Research: Why the Wheel of Cross-Cultural 
Methodology Keeps on Being Reinvented 
Erwin K. Scheuch* 
Abstract: Reviewing the earlier literature on methodolo-
gical issues in comparative research, the paper argues that 
'in terms of methodology in abstracto and on issues of re-
search technology, most of all that needed to be said has 
already been published.' Yet the actual research falls short 
of this available knowledge. Famous publications based on 
comparative research are really promulgators of research 
artefacts. Three goals are being emphasized: (a) to counte-
ract the tendency to reinvent the methodological wheel; (b) 
to help with ex post interpretations of data from cross-
national researbh; (c) to use the difficulties and pay-offs in 
comparisons fpr substantive insights. Thus, 'Galton's Pro-
blem' - treating countries as independent cases - forces an 
evaluation of the pervasiveness of diffusion vs. cultu-
ral/national identity. The low stability of many measures 
requires rethinking the meaning of one-point measure-
ments. Comparative surveys are by implication cross-level 
research. Therefore, the use of country-names as explanans 
requires theoretical notions about the nation as context for 
actors and institutions. 
The real problem is not the methodology per se, but it is methodological in its 
consequences: what can be done to make methodological advances and prac-
tical experiences in comparative research more cumulative? Or phrasing the 
question both more realistically and more depressing: how can we make know-
ledge in this area cumulative at all? 
Some 17 and 25 years ago, respectively, two major international conferences 
attempted to summarize the state of the art in comparative research both with 
' Originally published in: International Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1989, pp. 
147-167. We are grateful to the first editors for kindly permitting us to republish this 
article. 
This paper takes off from a presentation at the President's Session, convener Melvin 
Kohn, during the ASA-ipeetings in Chicago, August 1987. 
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respect to methodology strictu sensu but also for research technology. In 1964 
at Yale the leading spirit was Sandor Szalai, and the proceedings concentrated 
on macrostudies such as The World Handbook, The Yale Political Date Pro-
gram and the Human Relations Area File (cf. Merrit and Rokkan 1966). In 
general the accent was on the research philosophy, including the interrelation 
between research design and the objective of the comparison. 
In the second of the conferences, 1972 in Budapest, many of the same re-
searchers came together again. The main agenda was a post mortem on five 
large-scale comparative studies (Szalai and Petrella 1970): 'The Time Budget 
Project'; 'Juvenile Delinquency and Development'; 'Images of the World in the 
Year 2000'; the Jacobs and Jacobs study on leadership values; and the Verba 
and Nie Project on political participation1. All of these projects were based on 
survey research. This second time, basic discussions on design alternated with 
exchanges of management experiences in actually carrying out comparative 
research, and on technological devices2. 
The proceedings of both conferences have been published, and these books 
can still be considered as major compendia. Other creditable books have been 
published, such as 1984 How to Compare Nations by Mattei Dogan and Do-
minique Pelassy, and in the same year Manfred Nießen, Jules Peschar and 
Chantal Kurilsky (eds.): International Vergleichende Sozialforschung³ - both 
books remaining quite unknown in the USA. It is my considered judgement that 
for the time being, in terms of methodology in abstracto and on issues of 
research technology, most of all that needed to be said has already been publi-
shed. As an example for the methodological refinement already reached by the 
late sixties, see the internationally comparative study for the WHO on the uti-
lization of medical care facilities 1968-1969, with 48,000 interviews in 12 
research sites (Kohn and White 1976, especially Chapter 3). 
The problems that are encountered in practical research are not due to a lack 
of available methodological knowledge. In view of this appraisal of the state of 
the available methodological knowledge as against the state of the art in prac-
tical research, we set ourselves three modest goals: 
(a) To spread the message that methodological discussions are often rein-
venting what has been forgotten and influence actual research very little. 
Only in so far as they are included in textbook teachings do they have an 
imprint on a later generation of scholarship. 
1 Of course, not all of the five projects discussed had the same impact, but some 
became landmarks of the comparative approach. See Szalai et al. (1972); Verba and 
Nie (1973); Jacobs and Jacobs (1971). 
2 Of special importance here is the chapter by Szalai in Szalai and Petrella, op, cit., p. 
49-93. A brillant post mortem of the Jacobs and Jacobs project is Adam Przeworski 
and Henri Teune (1970). 
3 Instructive especially for practical problems in comparative survey work. Theses are 
the proceedings of a Conference by the Vienna Center of UNESCO, bringing toge-
ther social scientists from Eastern and Western Europe. 
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(b) To help with the ex post interpretation of data from cross-national survey 
research. This is especially necessary for the elementary unit of the ana-
lyses in this research: the implications of using 'country', 'nation', 'so-
ciety', or 'culture' respectively4. 
(c) To use the experiences with difficulties and pay-offs in the use of cross-
cultural surveys as opportunities for substantive insights. 
This is an opportune time to attempt this. This does not result, however, from 
new basic insights in the methodology of comparative research. There are none. 
There are two other conditions though, which make this attempt here not only 
timely but urgent. 
1. With a generational change among comparativists underway, there is the 
danger of a second case of collective amnesia in methodology. Towards the end 
of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies the methodological literature 
on comparativism had grown to such proportions that international institutions 
commissioned major bibliographies. The International Sociological Association 
requested Robert Marsh to prepare an overview of the literature since 1950 
(1966). The International Social Science Council had asked Elina Almasy for 
such a bibliography limited to survey research, and subsequently the Vienna 
Center of UNESCO issued a contract for an update (Rokkan et al. 1969, Almasy 
et al. 1976). Limiting himself to English language journals only and also so-
mewhat in the scope of subject matter, Frederick W. Frey from the MIT's 
Center of International Studies compiled an annotated bibliography with 1,600 
individual entries (Frey et al. 1969). 
Significantly, the first major undertaking in this area was missing in these 
sources. As early as the fifties the Division of Applied Social Science of UN-
ESCO gave a contract to the World Association for Public Opinion Research 
(WAPOR) to prepare a survey of journal articles on cross-cultural research 
between 1925 and 1955. Stuart C. Dodd and Jiri Nehnevajsa compiled 1,103 
entries, and unlike Fred Frey not limiting themselves to one language5. 
The comparativists of the late sixties and early seventies are probably largely 
ignored by the current younger American methodologists, as the centre of 
cross-cultural methodology had by then shifted to Europe (Szalai and Petrella 
1977)6. In turn, during this Europeanisation it was largely overlooked that there 
had been a sudden blossoming of comparative social research immediately after 
1945. A high point in this development was the 9-country study by Cantril and 
Buchanan (1953), and the development of standardized tests for international 
4 This distinction and its implications were first introduced into the methodological 
discussion by Rokkan (1970). 
5 This was the 'Project Demoscopes' of which a final report was submitted to UNES-
CO in 1956. To the best of this author's knowledge, the volume circulated only in 
mimeographed form (Dodd and Nehnevasja 1956). 
6 Two essays of that period afford an instructive overview of the issues already debated 
and often clarified: Wiatr (1970/71, 1971); Scheuch (1968: p. 176-209). 
174 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 18 — 1993 — No. 2, 172-195
surveys (such as the self-anchoring scale by Cantril, culture-free intelligence 
tests, and cross-culturally applicable versions of the MMPI and the n-achieve-
ment testing). As an example of a sophisticated discussion of measurement, see 
Cantril and Free (1962 : 4-30). A complete presentation of the issues in de-
veloping a culture-free scale can be found in Cantril (1965). Of the many areas 
of specialisation in which cross-cultural research at that time lead to important 
advances, see Glock (1954). At that time the centre of discussion was the North 
American continent, and a major forum for methodological contributions was 
the Mexico-based International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research. 
Then interest in comparative data waned in the USA in the later fifties. The 
International Journal ceased publication for lack of funds, and the US Public 
Opinion Quarterly dropped its section on World Polls. Hadley Cantril's attempt 
at a world-wide collection of public opinion material 1935-1946 found no 
successor (Cantril and Strunk 1951)7. All of these initiatives were largely for-
gotten by the mid-sixties when a new generation with different experiences 
dominated the methodological scene, spearheaded by Stein Rokkan and later 
Sandor Szalai8. 
As this is a time of another generational shift, this paper (and its notes) are an 
attempt to prevent yet another instance of reinventing the wheel in cross-cultu-
ral methodology. 
2. Comparative research, in so far as it meant data collection in several coun-
tries, was an expensive and administratively difficult undertaking (Sarapata 
1985: 157-82). This meant that as a rule the researcher was an experienced 
social scientist. Nowadays, comparative data are available to the less experien-
ced and underfunded, even to the moneyless graduate student. Two such re-
sources will be mentioned towards the end of this paper: ISSP and the EURO-
BAROMETER. Data from these sources are easily obtainable but difficult to 
analyse properly. Nonetheless, I hope to stimulate interest in secondary analysis 
with cross-cultural data. It is done with the conviction that even faulty com-
parative research has its merits. 
7 The closest to this endeavour was Kurt Baschwitz's 'Poll Index project 1947-1955' 
for WAPOR - which remained unpublished. 
8 The organisational nuclei had changed as well to the then active International Social 
Science Council (ISSC), and later to some of the newly installed Research Commit-
tees of the International Sociological Association. 
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Pitfalls in using country as a black box 
During the first spell of popularity that comparative research enjoyed following 
the end of World War II, the preferred tool was the survey - if possible 
representative for a country. The purpose of comparisons was to demonstrate 
numerically a uniqueness of the countries surveyed. What accounts for the 
aberrant political developments of industrialised Germany and modern Japan 
was a repeated topic of such comparisons using nationally representative sur-
veys 9. 
In such surveys, countries were treated as objects known in their peculiari-
ties. Thus, in their study of 'political culture', Almond and Verba assumed they 
knew that properties that could be shown as being peculiar to the USA could be 
used to define a democratic political culture, those peculiar to Mexico as denot-
ing an incompletely integrated system, and those specific for (Western) Ger-
many as an indication of a non-democratic milieu (Almond and Verba 1963; 
see also Verba 1965). Of course, in each of the countries compared one obtai-
ned some percentage points for each response-possibility; a perfect uniqueness 
in responses being out of the question in survey work. Percentage point dif-
ferences, in the case of Almond and Verba mostly between the marginals com-
pared, were treated as evidence. 
This logic and procedure are still quite frequent in internationally com para-
tive surveys. Examples are the Reader's Digest studies on consumers in Eu-
rope, the Shell International youth studies, and in comparative surveys on youth 
commissioned by the Japanese Prime Minister - all rather recent and well 
funded projects. In comparing practices in these studies, one can see that they 
imply the following: 
Implication no. 1: A mere aggregation of individual responses makes sense 
Implication no. 2: For purposes of explanation, individual questions can be 
used as variables 
Implication no. 3: Percentages are taken at face value, even though they may 
only indicate rank orders 
Implication no. 4: If data from several countries are compared, they are com-
pared as though they were regions within one country. 
9 The attempts to explain the political developments in Japan and Germany attributed a 
deterministic quality to (presumably) specific and single traits of the respective coun-
tries. Thus, Ruth Benedict (1946) related the political development of Japan to so-
cialisation practices, by which a certain code of honor is installed which men prevents 
the development of a democratic culture. Using additional material from survey 
search, Jean Stoetzel later refutes this argument on empirical grounds. The more basic 
objection to the type of argument used by Ruth Benedict is the doubtfulness of 
relating political development to one factor (be it socialisation or culture) as both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition. However, if one were to use 'country' only as a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition (e. g. developments in Germany made pos-
sible by an X-tradition plus triggered by Y-circumstances) one is forced to abandon 
the naive use of country as a black-box cause. 
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It is characteristic in this use of surveys as a tool of comparisons that a country 
is merely used as a dummy variable for all of the individual cases collected in 
that area. To proceed in this way appeals to common sense, but it is objectio-
nable in principle and will often lead to research artifacts. The Almond and 
Verba book on The Civic Culture was based on such analyses, not controlling 
for third factors. Undoubtedly, many statements in that text, widely used for 
instructional purposes, have to be included in the disturbing list of our research 
artefacts turned into required knowledge for students. 
The most elementary precaution when using country as a dummy variable is 
correcting the marginals for variables that are later used as independent variab-
les - such as the demography. Thus, in comparing Mexico with the United 
States by way of two-way tables - as in Almond and Verba - one should 
normalize through weighting operations the differences in age distribution and 
in occupational structure plus education, before interpreting differences in po-
litical participation as the result of differences in civic culture - or rather the 
verbal commitment to participation - showing that the United States is a par-
ticipatory political culture, while Mexico is not. 
This example was chosen with two considerations in mind: In all likelihood 
the differences cited by Almond and Verba for the global property 'participa-
tory political culture' are in this particular instance real and not artefacts - but 
still the procedure is not adequate to prove the point. And, of principal im-
portance, correcting marginal distributions by weighting may destroy the use-
fulness of having survey data from more than one country. Let us suppose that 
the purpose of our comparison were to demonstrate the changes in volume and 
style of participation as a function of high levels of education and high per-
centages of adults, then the differences between the United States and Mexico 
in these respects are just what was needed to clarify the issue 1 0. 
Before continuing with this point - that the methodological criteria in com-
parative work differ depending on the use that is made of the countries as 
contexts (see Hyman 1964: 153-88) - there are two more objections to be 
considered against this most naive use of cross cultural material - namely 
imputing observed differences by way of black-box argumentation to the coun-
tries: the stability of properties measured, and the pitfalls of the 'individualistic 
fallacy'. 
Decades of survey research should have taught the social science community 
that many of the percentages reported cannot be replicated. They were the 
property of a moment in time only. In 1973 representative samples in the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and in France had been asked 'What is the 
most important problem facing this country today?' 1 1. This was the rank order 
of the three problem areas at that time: 
10 A more detailed criticism of the Almond and Verba report can be found in Scheuch 
(1967). Vol. 1, Nos. 1-2 
11 The surveys were carried out by the Gallup organization. The example is taken from 
Douglas A. Hibbs (1985, p. 63-74). 
177 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 18 — 1993 — No. 2, 172-195
Rank 
Table 1 
Order of the Three Problem Areas 
France United States United Kingdom 
Domestic 
political 
Economic 
International 
and defence 
International 
and defence 
Economic 
Domestic political 
and social 
Economic 
Domestic political and social 
International 
and defence 
The differences between countries made intuitive sense as they conformed to 
national stereotypes: The French are self-centered, showing little interest in the 
world around them; the British are mercenary; and the United States are inter-
nationally hawkish. However, in 1962 among French voters, international and 
defence affairs had first priority by a large margin. And a measurement in 1978 
revealed the very same rank order of concern in all three countries compared. 
The data from the cross-polity survey are a case in point for developing 
countries (Banks and Textor 1963). In a decade-long labor-of-love the authors 
had coded information about developing countries - much in the spirit of the 
Human Relations Area File. Significantly, they used the sub-divisions of Africa 
that the former colonial powers had left behind as entities in the sense of 
Thailand and Ceylon. Prowdly they reported as proven causal nexus: former 
British possessions are characterised by democratic structures and independent 
legal systems; former French colonies are not. A few decades saw those dif-
ferences fade away. 
Are the Germans industrious? In a time series spanning 30 years, the result 
for questions referring to attitudes towards work differ by 30 percentage points 
(Scheuch 1988a). However, according to behavioral data, there cannot have 
been a major change. What measurements of attitudes showed as change was in 
all likelihood a mere change in the facon de parler. In general, we tend to 
overestimate the stability of measurements. Test-retest studies have de-
monstrated the merely approximative nature of measurements especially for 
attitudinal and opinion items' 2 . Cross-cultural surveys are especially demanding 
for the reliability and validity of observations. It is then a very risky underta-
king, to treat individual percentage point differences between countries as evi-
dence. Only a configuration (a 'Gestalt') of results can be trusted. 
Observation under differing conditions is the high road of social research. 
Sociology is an observational science in the sense of John Stuart Mill. This 
12 For a recent study, based on the German equivalent of the General Social Survey, the 
Allbus, see ZUMA-Nachrichten no. 20 (May 1987). 
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accepted, it is necessary to consider the central difference between observatio-
nal data and data from experiments. In experiments 'third factors' intervening 
between the assumed dependent and independent variables are controlled ex 
ante through design. For observational data this control is largely ex post 
through appropriate statistical techniques. Data from comparative survey re-
search are thus more difficult to analyse and interpret than experimental data. 
The many meanings of comparison 
The prevailing kind of comparative survey research is in practice a cross-level 
design with an unsatisfactory understanding of the highest of the levels. To 
understand this better, and to gain insight of what this means for analysis and 
interpretation, it is useful to recall a distinction proposed by Stein Rokkan: 
cross-national, cross-cultural, and cross-societal comparisons1 3. 
Usually, the nation-state is the geographical frame for sampling. Subsequent-
ly, the data collected in various nation-states are used as though that would also 
mean that the comparisons were cross-cultural and cross-societal as well. Whe-
ther the three meanings the geographical sampling frame could have - namely, 
nation, culture and society - do in fact coincide is in any particular case a 
substantive issue. 
'Juan Linz delineated eight Spains, Erik Allardt four Finlands, and Stein 
Rokkan as many Norways. Anyone knows that there are three Belgiums, four 
Italies, und five or six Frances' (Dogan and Pelassy 1984: 15). Whether the 
nation-state as a relatively recent form of political aggregation did in fact suc-
ceed in integrating social structures and neutralising older mediating levels 
differs by country and also by domain. This was controversially debated in the 
seventies under the umbrella of 'governability' of Western states. P. Schmitter 
led the partisans of corporatism - i. e. those who understood the survival of 
medieval structures during the process of nation building as a great advantage 
to a polity, and not at all as a liability as is usually argued. 
In the frequent comparative surveys, including the four Scandinavian coun-
tries, the most important one is the Welfare Survey, directed by Eric Allardt -
Finland is often the odd case. This proved to be true again in an investigation of 
the incidence of various illnesses. In particular, coronary heart disease has a 
much higher incidence in Finland than in neighbouring Sweden. An analysis of 
the survey data by sub-region, rather than only by country, showed that this 
high incidence was entirely due to the concentration of that ailment in the 
northern, much more rural half of Finland; values for the southern, more de-
veloped part - where one would otherwise expect higher incidences - were 
identical with rates for Sweden, Denmark and Norway. The currently accepted 
13 The taxonomy was in part inspired by Talcott Parsons' distinction between a social 
system, a cultural system, and the polity. 
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explanation for the concentration of coronary heart diseases in rural Northern 
Finland is the combined effect of life under stressful conditions for farmers, 
and especially lumber workers, and the fantastic levels of alcohol abuse in 
these dismal settings. It was not 'Finland' as a nation-state, culture or society 
that could account for the odd values, but Finland as an administrative unit 
included a setting with aberrant living conditions (see also Allardt 1966). 
The reverse problem, that the causative element is part of a much larger 
geographic context, is just as frequently overlooked. In this case the unit so-
ciety, or nation-state, or culture, is incorrectly used in sampling and as a frame 
in analyses. Thus, in Human Relations Area File one speaks of 'samples' that 
are drawn from 'cultures'. Maybe that is permissible for some ethnographic 
units, but not for the file as a world-wide collection. That issue had been 
debated in ethnology already at the turn of the century as 'Galton's Problem'. 
'Galton's Problem' is the issue whether a given culture can be thought of as 
'causing' something, or whether that something is instead the result of diffusion 
across cultures. The issue is given the name 'Galton's problem' as it was first 
raised by him during a meeting of the Royal Anthropological Institute in 1889. 
Galton, at that time already a most famous statistician, is quoted as having 
remarked in discussing a paper by Tylor: 'It was extremely desirable for the 
sake of those who may wish to study the evidence for Dr. Tylor's conclusion, 
that full information should be given as to the degree in which the customs of 
the tribes and races which are compared together are independent. It might be 
that some of the tribes had derived them from a common source, so that they 
were duplicate copies of the same original' (Tylor 1961 [1889]: 23). 
The Human Relations Area File the most ambitious effort so far at compa-
rative social research. Here, 'cultures' are treated as units in explanation -
within-culture variation (as is frequent in cross-cultural comparisons) being 
bypassed as an irritant14. 
With world-wide communication systems, unprecedented levels of interna-
tional trade, and a volume of cross-border travel exceeding the level of 400 
million movements per year, international diffusion is evidently a major factor 
in culture change 1 5. However, while the volume may be something unique, the 
phenomenon is not new at all. A case in point are eating habits and presumably 
14 The official presentation of the program is George P. Murdock (1949). The most 
important methodologist of this approach is Raoull Naroll (1961, p. 15-39; 1965, p. 
428-451). A discussion of the various proposals to neutralise the effects of diffusion, 
and consequendy being able to treat the 'cultures' as statistically independent units, 
can be found in Thomas Schweizer (1978 especially Ch. 5). 
15 On tourism as a vehicle of international diffusion see Scheuch (1981, especially p. 
1109 ff). Also Eric Cohen (1979); T. Hamer (1979); K. Hudson (1972); H. Matthews 
(1978); C. G. Varley (1978). A case in point for the increasing internationalisation of 
tourism is Western Germany. Here, die share of vacations spent abroad rose from 15 
per cent in 1954, to 50 per cent in 1967, and to 69 per cent in 1987; cf. Franz Dundler 
(1988, Table 4). 
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national cuisines in Western Europe 1 6. Before a social scientist attributes the 
dominant position of the potato in the German cuisine to a German preference 
to dig deep, he should consider another causation: the combined effect of a 
climate disadvantageous to a great many agricultural products, and the efficien-
cy with which authorities in an area, that was later named Prussia, could force 
the population to accept this then new vegetable of American Indians. 
'Gallon's problem' is everywhere! In comparative work it is fraught with the 
danger to use a stochastic approach in selecting study areas in the whole We-
stern world if one looks for explanations of differences in consumer styles, 
leisure behavior, or food preferences. Differences between e. g., Scandinavia, 
Germany and France in their preferences for housing and interior equipment 
were considerable twenty years ago, and they were usually attributed to 'cultu-
re'. Differences still exist, but the kind of changes since then have to be largely 
attributed to national housing policies and the different policies of the respec-
tive industries (as long as these were protected by customs barriers and admi-
nistrative chicaneries). While in many respects a Western European society is 
emerging with a strong 'family likeness' between the countries, quite a bit of 
descriptive knowledge, including historical information, is required before re-
maining country differences can be attributed to black boxes called Spain or 
Britain. 
Since the mid-sixties, protest movements have become a routine element in 
the politics of Western Europe 1 7. There are cross-national differences and si-
milarities but the factors explaining differences are primarily not national but 
cultural. Those movements have become an as yet uninstitutionalised parallel 
to institutionalised politics - and as such are a characteristic of Protestant 
Europe, and within that context weaker in Lutheran areas. Maybe that is true 
only as description, and to turn the descriptive correlations into an explanation 
is premature. Is it really something in Protestantism as a religious culture? Or is 
it at least in part the consequence of its younger clergy? Or is it mainly the 
consequence of a tension between the desire for individual moral/religious 
commitment, and the waning of institutionalised religion in a society with high 
functional differentiation? Or is it an interrelation of all those factors? All this 
is currently unclear. What is clear is the fact that the explanandum cuts accross 
the administrative boundaries of nation-states. States that enclose both Prote-
stant and Catholic territories - that is the case in West Germany - offer an 
opportunity for a check as to which factor is the stronger: religious culture or 
16 The famous French cuisine of the late 18th century was an import from northern 
Italy; the Italian noodle was brought to that country by Marco Polo as an import from 
China. Consequendy, an attempt to develop a sociology of food could not use coun-
tries of Western Europe in a naive way as a collective variable in explanation, and 
any sociology of food for that area would lead to grievous errors if it were to lack a 
historical dimension. 
17 An analysis of this development - using data from five countries - will be found in 
Samuel H. Branes and Max Kaase (1979). 
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nation-state. Both are relevant, but religious culture appears to be the much 
stronger one (Scheuch 1987). 
While nation-states, culture, or society may be too large a unit for a causal 
attribution (e. g. the Finnish example) or too small (as in the case of protest 
movements), it may also be too weak a context to account for differences 
observed with individual data. True, in its most ideological form the nation-
state assumes a basic sameness among its citizens. However, all industrial 
societies are pluralistic + and if material well-being and the political system 
permit this, they are so pluralistic that often within-country differences are 
larger than between-country differences. 
Since the seventies, fpe High Commisssion for the Common Market has 
comparative surveys carried out in all member states several times a year, the 
F.UROBAROMETER 1 8. One does observe differences in percentage distributions; 
some of them even remain consistent even over time. An example are levels of 
dissatisfaction in various countries, where satisfaction levels are consistently 
below average in Italy, average in West Germany, and above average in Den-
mark. However, variations for such attitudinal data rarely exceed 10 per cent 
between the countries high and low on a measurement. Obviously, when bet-
ween-country variances are smaller than within-country variations, then it is 
quite improbable that references to countries can be understood as explana-
tions. In such pluralistic societies, survey research can usually be treated as 
observation under differing conditions, and not as a test of the meanings and 
effects of a culture, a society or a polity. 
The many difficulties, and as a consequence the many errors in an attribution 
when using units such as{ Japan, or Australia, or Hungary as black box expla-
nation should lead us to two conclusions: 
1. Very often we do not really know what we are talking about when we use 
nation-names. 
2. One needs a great Istore of descriptive knowledge before one can use 
nation names as expjlanans in comparative work. 
Nation names in global studies 
In the discussion of the ecological fallacy, a distinction between aggregate and 
global properties of higher order units - such as regions or nation-states -
gained currency (Scheuch 1969). 
18 The data and machine readable code books are available to die social science com-
munity direcdy through the Zentralarchiv at the University of Cologne, or indirectly 
through data archives tha|t are members of the International Federation of Data Ar-
chives (IFDO). 
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It is not uncommon in comparative survey research to use aggregated pro-
perties, and that can lead to a fallacy that is specific for that mode of procedure: 
the 'individualistic fallacy' of incorrectly imputing to the higher order unit the 
aggregation of values for individuals. Using responses by the same individuals 
to characterise nations or cultures, and also as an explanandum, one is in 
danger of circular reasoning. Beyond that, many of the aspects of a nation or a 
culture are global properties in the sense that Lazarsfeld uses the term. By 
definition global properties are those characteristics of a collective that cannot 
be explained by the composition of the individual units 1 9. 
One influential type of comparative research can be labelled 'global studies'. 
This approach is characterised by using the largest number of countries pos-
sible - as is true for ethnological research for The Human Relations Area File, 
and the Cross-Polity Survey - treating the countries as black boxes being si-
multaneously congruent with societies, cultures and nations. Survey data are 
only part of the empirical base but, by treating a very large number of societies 
as global entities, it is here that the use of surveys is often improper on logical 
grounds. 
These global studies are especially instructive for the country-as-black-box 
approach in comparative work. 
Beginning with the Yale Political Data Handbook, global studies attained a 
certain importance, especially in political sociology (Russett et al. 1964). Even 
though the use of countries in the YPDH was already serverely cruised in the 
early sixties, that argument had absolutely no effect on this project, nor on 
other global studies 2 0. Ted Gurr and David Singer (1972) started a 'school' 
relating incidences of violence - a typical aggregate property for within-nation 
violence but certainly not so for between-nation violence - to global properties 
of nations (Singer and Small 1972; Wallace and Singer 1973; Gurr 1968, 
1974) 2 1. More central for sociology has been the world systems approach by 
Immanuel Wallerstein. It became a veritable research paradigm, possibly be-
cause of its ideological appeal (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1984; see also Bollen 
1983; Haman and Carrol 1988) 2 2. A related 'school' started by Peter Heintz 
Apart from physical characteristics, for social characteristics that are global in nature, 
Robert K. Merton has given a theoretical rationale: the'principle of emergence'. For 
nation-states mere are hardly any attempts to specify such 'emergences'. 
20 Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (1966) is largely a detailed methodological 
critique of the black-box approach of the Global Studies as exemplified by the 
YPDH. 
21 An elaborate and critical review of the Singer-Gurr school is Ekhard Zimmermann 
(1977). 
22 The ideological commitment that in French is ironizised as tiers mondism is quite 
evident in Wallerstein's follower Volker Bornschier (1980); also with Christopher 
Chase-Dunn (1985). When critics pointed to the obvious problem of all global stu-
dies, that countries in various parts of the world are different as social entities, and 
that the social problems of Africa were quite unlike those of Latin America, Born-
schier maintained: die correlates of underdevelopment were the same the world over 
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(the late President of the 'Weltgesellschaft' foundation in Switzerland) under-
stands this comparison of the largest feasible number of nation-states as an 
attempt to test propositions in a quasi-experimental design (Heintz 1969, 1973, 
1982). 
In all these cases the nations compared are treated as black boxes. In just 
correlating an input variable, such as foreign investment, with an output variab-
le, such as per capita income, all structural properties of nation-states are ig-
nored. True, by using partial regressions for the largest possible number of 
countries to establish relations between input and output variables of countries 
treated as systems, one eliminates all third factors as in an experiment. But it is 
just this that makes this 'largest numbers of black-box countries'-approach 
unsociological. If theoretically sounding terms are used, as by the Wallerstei-
ners with their terms 'center', 'periphery, or 'dependencia' or 'world system', 
they are undefined and/or used metaphorically23. Taken as an approach, global 
studies are probably more responsible for research artefacts than any other 
comparative approach. 
The so-called 'world models' can be considered intellectually as a spin-off 
from global studies. World models that strongly influenced public discussion, 
such as those of the Club of Rome (important in Western Europe), Global 2000 
(of primary interest in the USA), of the Bariloche model (oriented to the public 
of Latin America) were really designed as educational (or propaganda) tools. 
Their authors meant them to be self-destroying prophecies. Frightened by the 
picture of a future as sketched in the world model, the public would pressure 
for action to avoid the predicted fate. Such models are easy to design: In an 
equation predicting growth that includes many factors, one merely has to po-
stulate that at least one factor will have a slower growthrate than the other 
factors; then that one factor will create the bottelneck causing the system to 
come to a grinding halt. 
'To compare two events or two things is always a process of matching... No 
two events are all alike in everything, but we compare them in those aspects 
that matter for the purpose at hand. We also therefore compare things which in 
other aspects are not comparable', writes Karl W. Deutsch (1985: 5), one of the 
pioneers of comparativism in social research. From this perspective it becomes 
obvious how hazardous an approach the use of countries as black boxes is. 
Deutsch proceeds in arguing that in comparative research countries should be 
treated as systems with internal transactions that decline - gradually or abruptly 
at system boundaries - While other processes, therefore termed outer processes, 
(1980: 170). For a criticism of the 'school', and an empirical refutation of the con-
tention by Boraschier, see Carl Olivia (1987: 531); also Erich Weede (1986: 
421^*41). 
23 Michael Hester points to this in his review (1975: 217-22). The lack of distinctive-
ness in using the term 'world system' is criticised by Arthur L. Stinchcombe in a 
review (1982: 1389-1395). 
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' . . . may be more frequent or more powerful outside the boundaries of the 
system than inside of it' (ibid.). Properties of systems are not simply additive -
within and/or systems the properties are reactive. This systemic character of the 
units compared is characteristically ignored in global studies, and global studies 
even fail in the first consideration quoted here by not testing the rationale for 
comparing properties. 
Deutsch proceeds to propose three catalogues of basic functions to be used as 
common yardsticks in comparisons accross many countries. 
(a) In the General Theory of Action, Talcott Parsons delineates in his 
AGIL-Scheme four BASIC FUNCTIONS OF SYSTEMS: 
- Pattern maintenance; 
- Adaptation; 
- Goal attainment; 
- Integration. 
To this Karl W. Deutsch adds - he claims 'ultimately' with the consent of 
Parsons, but that is here of secondary relevance only - two more basic 
functions: 
- Goal change; 
- Self-transformation (transformation in some dimensions while maintai-
ning continuity in others - as in revolutions). 
With the two additional functions, Deutsch attempts to make Parsonian 
functionalism more useful for analysing system changes. 
(b) A set of eight POLITICAL NEEDS OF MODERN POPULATIONS - a set 
that comes in four pairs, one of the poles denoting tangibles, the opposite 
intangibles2 4. 
- Maintenance of physical equipment . . . and of the authority system 
- Increase of physical capital . . . ethics of performance (Leistungsethik) 
- Communication equipment . . . readiness for communication 
- Preservation of environment . . . need for spontaneity 
(c) On the level of STATE FUNCTIONS, Deutsch postulates seven charac-
teristic ones, five of which are important in the present world already, 
two more to become decisive within the next hundred years. 
- Internal order; 
- International power; 
- Increase wealth; 
- Promote common welfare; 
- Mobilisation of relevant populations; 
- Adaptive learning (new); 
- New initiatives (just emerging). 
24 The labels subsequently used in the taxonomies are in part inferred by us, as Deutsch 
somedmes uses sentences instead of phrases for traits. This is especially true when he 
incorporates elements of Zeitgeist discussion. Specifically for the function of the 
state, the responsibility for a possible mislabelling would be mine. 
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Several objections against such catalogues - specifically the one for popula-
tions and the one for the state - are obvious. The one for population, worked 
out jointly with Rudolf Wildenmann und Bruno Fritsch (another "Weltgesell-
schaft '-social scientist from Switzerland), is indebted to the spirit of the time 
('Zeitgeist'), and has no rationale save its appeal to plausibility. An ad-hoc-
ishness is even more evident for the list of functions of the state. One is 
reminded of the twenties when lists of basic needs, or drives, or level of per-
sonality were being proposed by psychologists. However, while none of these 
suggestions of the twenties was empirically 'proven', they were useful mile-
stones in making psychology more cumulative. 
Thus, it might indeed be preferable to continue with Deutsch's hypothesis 
that these needs will be important in all industrialised countries organized as 
pluralistic democracies. 'Comparative research on the twenty or thirty indu-
strial democracies in the world would tell us whether this is in fact the case or 
not' (Deutsch 1985: 8). Survey procedures would have an important part in the 
research design for such i project. It would still belong to the tradition of global 
studies, and yet avoid the black box treatment - the latter meaning by impli-
cation excluding a contribution to sociological theory. 
Countries as unstable aggregates and stable configurations 
When using nation-states as sampling frames, then proceeding to compare as 
observations under differing conditions, the use of countries presents no pro-
blem of a principal nature. There is merely the practical problem whether the 
researcher is sufficiently Well informed about the conditions in a country. Ho-
wever, countries are also chosen as units in comparison because one wants to 
relate their unique (?) configuration of properties, including global properties, 
to the dependent variables. In doing this, several problems occur that are fre-
quently not seen at all. 
It is usual in comparing values for some variables between several countries 
to take for granted what (he countries stand for. Most often this is identical to 
the stereotypes current in intellectual circles in one's home country. After all, 
everyone knows what France stands for? But does one really even in an ele-
mentary sense? The process of nation-building penetrated to with varying 
degrees into the social structure of current countries - as is now becoming 
apparent even in nation-states as classical as those of England and France. The 
monopolization of functions at the national level is a variable, not a defining 
constant of every nation-state. 
The present-day nation-states in Europe and America could be understood, 
according to this perspective, as unique aggregates of properties which do not 
coincide with the domain of state. The Federal Republic may on occasions be 
described as 'capitalistic' as is Japan; in another perspective, however, as 'Eu-
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ropean' in contrast to Japan, and jointly so with the GDR. The GDR may as a 
political system regard itself as part of a socialist world, together with Tanzania 
and Vietnam, but it is also an industrial society and as such more dissimilar to 
Bulgaria than to the Federal Republic. 
There exists a German culture and this does not, nor ever did, coincide with 
the political boundaries of any one political entity. For village life, in so far as 
this still exists today in central Europe, there is something like an Alpine 
village life in contrast to the village life of the North German lowlands. In the 
demography and fertility patterns the Federal Republic and the GDR are, com-
pared with developing countries, part of an aggregate of 'old societies'. 
Internationally comparative surveys among industrialised and affluent de-
mocracies already show outlines of a common civic culture. The results of the 
1985 International Social Survey Programme are an example 2 5. Among a whole 
battery of questions relating to the role of government, it was asked: 
'All systems of justice make mistakes, but which do you think is worse -
To convict an innocent person? 
To let a guilty person go free?' 
Table 2 
Australia West Britain USA Austria Italy 
Germany 
% % % % % % 
Convict innocent 77.1 85.3 76.7 75.2 82.6 82.0 
Guilty goes free 22.9 14.7 23.3 24.8 17.4 18.0 
The differences cluster in two groups: an Anglo-Saxon variant of the civic 
culture, and a continental variation (Table 2). And between the two there is a 
distinctive family-likeness. For a methodologist this is a nightmarish confir-
mation of the fear that Galton's problem lurks everywhere. For the social 
scientist motivated by substantive interests it is a suggestion that Deutsch is 
most likely right in assuming a common culture for industrialised affluent 
democracies. 
Sometimes differences are quite substantial, and yet they are obviously re-
sponse distributions following the same pattern. To give an example from the 
same ISSP survey 1985: 
The ISSP is a loose federation of organisations carrying out a variant of the General 
Social Survey of the USA. Each year a common module of 15 minutes of questions is 
fielded internationally. Data and machine readable code books are available from the 
archive of the ISSP, the Zentralarchiv at the University of Cologne. 
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Australia 
% 
i West 
Germany 
% 
Britain 
% 
USA 
% 
Austria 
% 
Italy 
% 
Agree strongly 
Agree 
Neither 
Disagree 
Disagree 
strongly 
15.1 
27.8 
16.3 
24.3 
16.5 
29.5 
26.9 
23.5 
10.0 
10.1 
22.5 
29.7 
24.0 
17.5 
6.2 
12.5 
17.0 
20.5 
30.7 
19.4 
36.7 
29,6 
21.4 
7.3 
4.9 
30.5 
36,5 
18.3 
12.4 
2.2 
Here the countries line tip along a different axis than before (Table 3). Going by 
welfare state indicators, the correlation appears to be: the larger the public 
sector and the welfare state apparatus, the smaller the acceptance of income 
inequalities26. Of course, this is merely a first diagnosis which needs to be 
tested for contextual effects. Historical factors need to be considered as to 
whether there could be a| common causal agent for both variables: size of public 
sector and rejection of income inequality. 
However, the more important lesson from both examples is: in our expla-
nations we are here not really dealing with countries as distinct entities but with 
different locations as sets of conditions. Given nation-states of the 'First' and of 
the 'Second' World, one may safely assume that in most instances of cross-
cultural surveys these countries are not the causative entities in their global or 
'cultural' peculiarities. In most instances of actual survey research countries 
affect the explanandum as a set of conditions. 
Immediately after World War II, whenever surveys showed a difference -
especially among American social scientists - the usual interpretation was a 
reference to 'culture' 2 7. For the already mentioned aberrant political develop-
ments in Japan and Germany, 'culture' was even habitually referred to as 
causative. Thus, B. H. Schaffner (1948) explained the successes of Nazism in 
Germany with the conditioning to authoritarianism in a specific 'German' fa-
26 For the methodological problems in computing an indicator for the size of the public 
sector and growth of governments, see Tom W. Rice (1986: 233-257). The historical 
dimension of differences) between Western European developments is characterised in 
Peter Flora, Jens Alber ind Jürgen Kohl (1977: 707-722); Peter Flora and Arnold J. 
Heidenheimer (1981). 
27 The emphasis on 'culture' as causaüve for an explanandum was a characteristic, 
anyway, of the 'Chicago school' since Robert Park, and to a large part of American 
sociology. 
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mily tradition. There was no proof offered nor even looked for, whether there 
was indeed a specific German family tradition - different from bourgeois fa-
mily traditions in France or England. By way of contrast, in the very same year, 
1948, another research report by David Rodnik argued that German families 
were overly warm in their socialisation practices. On the descriptive level the 
contradiction between the two reports was probably due to an emphasis on 
different strata in German society. 
In referring to whole societies, such as Poland or the Federal Republic, one is 
plagued by doubts that our characterisation of such whole societies lacks cri-
teria for what is important and what is ephemeral. There is a continuity in 
Polish society, unaffected by the great changes in the territory of the state, even 
unaffected by the reduction of the Poles to the status of national minorities 
within the borders of other states, but what is this - partly latent - continuity? 
In this twentieth century, 'the Germans' were the population of an imperial 
domain (Kaiserreich) which was simultaneously conservative and yet moder-
nising rapidly; afterwards they lived with a rather liberal republic (Weimar), 
and subsequently with a quite efficient form of totalitarianism. Since the Se-
cond World War the Germans exist side by side as the populations of two 
political systems of a totally different kind, in their respective 'Western' and 
'Eastern' contexts which are relatively equally successful. What constitutes 
continuity in constant change? The attempted partial and ad-hoc-answer for 
Germany was: (a) elements of the stratification system and the work orienta-
tion, distinct features of the leadership sub-culture, and the exclusion of ideo-
logical cleavages from whole domains of life; (b) the corporatistic network of 
intermediation between the level of state and the private worlds (cf. Scheuch 
1988b). 
In the USA, Japan, and the countries of Continental Western Europe both 
aspects of a modernised country are apparent: social change is common and 
rapid but at the same time there is strong continuity as countries in comparison 
with one another - despite the complaints of cultural critics about universal 
Américanisation. This is less true for many parameters which are emphasized 
in the description of social systems as global collectives: the value of the GNP, 
living standards, distribution of income, even occupational structures and types 
of housing. Differences in housing are one of the most obvious distinctions 
between the USA, Britain, France, Germany, Denmark and Italy. However, 
surveys have shown that differences in housing preferences in the respective 
populations are much smaller by far than differences on the supply side. Pri-
marily, these obvious differences were the consequence of a shortage of urban 
housing on the Continent for generations plus regulatory policies of govern-
ments. Thus, they cannot be used as expressions of popular culture - rather 
they are indicators of differences between economies and polities. 
Differences which, toward the end of the fifties, seemed to social scientists 
as characteristic of countries - such as variations in the value of GNP and in 
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living standards - are viewed over time as quite unreliable indicators distin-
guishing e. g., between England and Italy. These properties are, however, of 
key importance to mark the position of the 'trilateral' countries (Japan, 
USA/Canada, Western Europe, Australia/New Zealand) vis-a-vis the entire 
world. The 'affluent society' can in many respects - life styles, marriage pat-
terns, orientation towards work - be regarded as a distinct social type. Affluent 
society means a new priority of values, it means a shift of apprehensions from 
economics to events in one's private world, implies a higher degree of insti-
tutional differentiation, and, as a consequence, a greater need for integrative 
processes and institutions. On the basis of a more intuitive recall of survey 
results we feel certain th|at these affluent countries have a strong family likeness 
as social systems. Unfortunately we lack a theoretical rationale, empirically 
supported, for this judgement. 
After decades of reading results from comparative surveys we feel encou-
raged to suggest that a more sociological characteristic of a society may be its 
mode and degree of differentiation. Central for modern societies appears to be 
the acceptance of sectorial autonomy, combined with domain-specific ratio-
nalities (Eigengesetzlichkeit). Phrased in Parsonian language this means that 
diffuse orientations turn into functionally specific ones. That we are identifying 
central and distinctive elements of societies is suggested by signs of diso-
rientation that visitors from less differentiated societies display with this very 
aspect of everyday life in an economically and socially modern society. Histo-
rically and worldwide, multi-functionality of behavior and institutions has been 
prevalent, and a minimum of multi-functionality and functional diffuseness 
may be crucial for social stability. Was Durkheim right in suspecting that so-
cieties characterised by sheer mechanical solidarity were untenable in the long 
run? (Hence Durkheim's plea for corporatism). 
A central lesson from comparative survey research 
Viewed over a period of nearly three decades, there are two dominant experien-
ces: 
1. Comparisons that include both modern and developing countries produce 
differences that are very hard to interpret - if they make sense at all. An 
example: in youth surveys one observes young people in developing countries 
reacting with high degrees of optimism that factually are completely inappro-
priate - such as in India. By way of contrast, young people in Sweden or in the 
Netherlands exude gloom in the wake of incomparably greater opportunity. In 
appraisals of parent-child relations there appears to be zero correlation, if not a 
negative one, between differences in restrictiveness of behavior and differences 
in expressed evaluation. Of course, that should not be read as a 'no' to com-
parative survey research but it points to a need for intensive consideration of 
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intervening and contextual factors before differences between countries can be 
'explained'. In routine research such comparisons are advisable only for the 
'most different' designs in testing universals2 8. 
2. Comparisons between countries with similar levels of modernity are fru-
strating and stimulating at the same time: most of the time, the differences at 
the level of individual measurement do not account for differences at an insti-
tutional level, especially not for the behavior of formal organisation, and hardly 
at all for differences between polities. Hence one has to introduce substantive 
assumptions about system features for the polities between which comparisons 
are attempted. One needs theory - and usually middle-level theory - to make 
sense of data. 
Comparative research in its very frustrations, using countries as part of rea-
lity and not mere data collection frames, can be a major stimulant for a theo-
retically guided description, and an empirically grounded macro-sociological 
theory. Two developments should help to attract researchers, especially youn-
ger ones, to such comparisons. 
(a) Since the early seventies the European Community has four times a year 
conducted representative surveys in all of its member countries - twelve coun-
tries by now. This material of the EUROBAROMETER allows both comparisons 
- a time series analysis and a cross-national comparison. The demographic 
section permits tests as to how important the level nation is relative to other 
integrative institutions. It is easy to relate these survey data to masses of non-
survey data produced by institutions. 
(b) The 'General Social Surveys' of several countries have developed inter-
nationally comparative modules, the ISSP (International Social Survey Pro-
gramme). These are the topics of international modules2 9: 
- 1985 Role of government 
- 1986 Social networks and support systems 
- 1987 Social stratification 
- 1988 The family 
- 1989 World of work 
All of the participating countries are of the highly modern variety, making 
comparisons at the level of countries less hazardous with respect to research 
artefacts. 
28 The distinction between the two designs 'most similar systems' and 'most different 
systems' in using countries was proposed by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune 
(1970). The most similar design is the preferred design in specifying time-space 
coordinates for a non-universal relationship or factor. On implications in choosing 
and using countries in the comparative approach, see also Mattei Dogan and Domi-
nique Pelassy (1984, Part 3, especially pp. 117-32). The considerations seem to be 
strongly related to John Stuart Mill's rules of evidence in causal attribution. 
29 A large number of these surveys is already available through member institutes of the 
International Federation of Data Organizations (IFDO) in Germany the Zentralarchiv 
of the University of Cologne. 
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Now that we are dataWch, the limiting condition in advancing knowledge is 
our poverty in not having a theory of society. 
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